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I.

Introduction

Merging firms have been increasingly asking trial courts to determine the legality of their
merger “as remedied” by a voluntary “fix,” rather than based on the merger agreement in the
original Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) submission.1 These fixes typically involve remedy proposals
that the reviewing antitrust agency has rejected. This procedure has been termed “Litigating-theFix” (LTF).2 LTF remedies may involve the buyer divesting assets to a third party,3 the seller
retaining assets in a business that competes with a buyer business,4 the buyer committing to

* The authors are Professor Emeritus of Economics and Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Center (Salop) and
Assistant Professor of Law, Delaware Law School of Widener University (Sturiale). We are grateful to
Bill Baer, Darren Bush, Dale Collins, Daniel Culley, Daniel Francis, Andrew Gavil, Nicholas Hill, Herb
Hovenkamp, John Kwoka, Mark Lemley, Doug Melamed, Eric Posner, Robby Robertson, Spencer Weber
Waller, and Dan Zach for helpful comments, and Maryanne Magnier for excellent research assistance. All
opinions and errors remain our own.
1

For some recent examples, see, e.g., Memorandum, United States v. Booz Allen Hamilton Co. et al.,
1:22CV01603 (Jun. 29, 2022); United States v. Bertelsmann SE & Co., 1:21CV02886 (D.D.C. 2022)
(Penguin RandomHouse/Simon & Schuster); United States v. Unitedhealth Group, Inc., 1:22CV00481
(D.D.C. 2022); Initial Decision, In re Illumina, Inc. and GRAIL, Inc., Docket No. 9401 (Sept. 9, 2022).
2

See, e.g., Steven H. Schulman & E. Marcellus Williamson, Litigating the Fix: FTC v. Libbey, Inc.- A
Private Party Perspective, A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, CLAYTON ACT NEWSLETTER, Vol. III, No. 1
(Dec. 2002); Richard Liebeskind, Litigating the Fix: FTC v. Libbey, Inc.- A Government Perspective,
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, CLAYTON ACT NEWSLETTER, Vol. III, No. 1 (Dec. 2002).
3

See, e.g., FTC v. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.D.C. 2004) (Arch Coal entered an agreement
to sell off one of the coal mines it intended to acquire); FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15
(D.D.C. 2015) (defendants proposed to divest a collection of regional food distribution facilities to the
third-largest distributor in the United States); United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C.
2017) (Aetna proposed divestiture of a portion of its Medicare Advantage business to third-party health
insurance company); FTC v. RAG-Stiftung, 436 F. Supp. 3d 278, 304 (D.D.C. 2020) (divesting Canadian
plant).

4

See FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D.D.C. 2002) (amended merger agreement provided
seller would transfer subsidiary Anchor’s foodservice business to another division, sell two glassmaking
factories to Libbey, and buy glassware from an outside source).
2

certain conduct duties or constraints,5 or some combination thereof.6 These remedies may be
unilateral promises, commitments placed into an amended merger agreement, or formal
agreements with a divestiture buyer, customers, or others.
This trend will increase if the agencies demand stronger consent decrees or if the
agencies adopt a “just say no” policy of refusing to negotiate consent decrees.7 Either way, the
merging parties have the incentive to request judicial assessment of proposed remedies to combat
what they see as agency overreach. Courts generally have denied agency motions in limine to
exclude consideration of these remedies, at least where the merging parties have offered a
definite remedy with sufficient time for the reviewing agency to investigate.8
This article proposes a judicial procedure for managing cases in which the merging
parties attempt to LTF. Our recommendations flow from our analysis of LTF case law, the
merger enforcement record, the language and goals of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and
economic analysis of the incentives for merging parties and agencies that LTF creates. Our
recommended procedure allows LTF in most instances but mitigates the potential for
anticompetitive effects from doing so. We build on the analysis and proposals of other scholars

5

See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, Penguin Random House/Simon & Schuster, 1:21CV02886
(D.D.C. 2022) (Penguin promised an internal bidding policy, whereby its separate publishing divisions
would compete post-merger); Memorandum, United States v. Booz Allen Hamilton Co., 1:22CV01603
(Oct. 11, 2022) (sister businesses would bid competitively post-merger); In re Illumina, Inc. and GRAIL,
Inc., Docket No. 9401 (Sept. 9, 2022) (Illumina committed to an “open offer” supply agreement with
Grail’s competitors); United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 2018) (agreement to
arbitrate for dissatisfied customers and no supply blackouts during negotiations); United States v. CCC
Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (merging parties proposed revising software license with a
smaller competitor to remove restrictions); United States v. Franklin Electric Co., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d
1025, 1026 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (remedy proposal was a third-party licensing program).

6

See, e.g., Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d 34 (seller would retain business and buyer would provide inventory
for a period); UHG/Change, 1:22CV00481 (D.D.C. 2022) (divestiture plus firewall to prevent
downstream foreclosure).

7

AAG Jonathan Kanter, Opening Remarks at 2022 Spring Enforcers Summit
(April 4, 2022); AAG Jonathan Kanter, Antitrust Enforcement: The Road to Recovery, Remarks as
Prepared for Delivery (April 21, 2022); Assa Abloy AB’s Answer and Defenses, United States v. Assa
Abloy and Spectrum Brands Holding, Inc., 1:22CV02791 (Oct. 14, 2022) (answer to complaint).
8
See. e.g., Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109; Aetna, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1; Sysco, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1; Libbey,
211 F. Supp. 2d 34; CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26. The most notable exception is Ardagh; the court
there excluded consideration of an “11th hour suggestion” of a proposed divestiture after discovery, expert
reports, and briefing, and the proposal included neither a signed agreement, a price, nor a plan for how the
divested assets would be employed to preserve competition. See Transcript of Pre-Hearing Conference,
FTC v. Ardagh, No. 13-1021 (D.D.C. 2013) at Tr. 13:19-25.
3

and commentators.9 Our proposed procedure has some features that are similar to a recent
proposal by professors Kwoka and Waller but is more defendant-friendly.10
In general, district courts have required merging firms to propose definite remedies with
sufficient time for the agencies to investigate. They have not, however, consistently allocated
the parties’ respective evidentiary burdens. When the defendants propose a behavioral remedy
and the structural presumption of illegality based on post-merger concentration would apply to
the unremedied merger, they have generally (sometimes implicitly) placed the burden on the
defendants to rebut the presumption.11 But they have been less consistent in their approach when
the proposed remedy includes divestiture or leaving certain seller assets out of the acquisition.12
In developing our procedure, we have been guided by Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
which is concerned with preventing competitive harm in its “incipiency.”13 As the Supreme
Court stated in American Stores, “Section 7 itself creates a relatively expansive definition of
antitrust liability: To show that a merger is unlawful, a plaintiff need only prove that its effect
'may be substantially to lessen competition.’”14 The “incipiency standard” has been interpreted

9

See, e.g., D. Bruce Hoffman, Remedial Self-Help in Merger Litigation After Arch Coal, 19 ANTITRUST
32 (2005); Thomas J. Horton. Fixing Merger Litigation “Fixes”: Reforming the Litigation of Proposed
Merger Remedies Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 S. DAK. L. REV. 165, 191 (2010); Steven
C. Salop, Merger Settlement and Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2647 (2013); David Gelfand & Leah Brannon, A Primer on Litigating the Fix, 31
ANTITRUST 10 (2016).
10

John Kwoka & Spencer Weber Waller, Fix It or Forget It: A “No-Remedies” Policy for Merger
Enforcement, 2 COMP. POL. INT. 1 (2021).
11

See, e.g., CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 26; Franklin Electric, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025 at 10
(“Plaintiff bears the burden of showing the reasonable probability that the proposed joint venture will
result in a substantial impairment of competition. That burden never shifts to defendants. However,
defendants have the burden of proving their contention that because of the proposed licensing and supply
agreements with Environ the number of competitors will not change.”).

12

See e.g., Mem. Opinion Denying FTC’s Motion in Limine, FTC v. Arch Coal, No. 1:04CV00534, at 7
(D.D.C. July 7, 2004) (on file with authors) (evaluating the merger as modified by the divestiture, stating
that ”Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires the Court to review the entire transaction in question.”); Sysco,
113 F. Supp. 3d 1 at 57 (applying the structural presumption to the merger as modified in the HSR filing
and assigned defendants the rebuttal burden of establishing that the divestiture was sufficient to maintain
competition); Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d 34 at 47-50 (finding that the surviving business would face higher
costs and other competitive impediments, implying that competition likely would be decreased, since the
surviving business would find higher costs and other impediments).

13

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962); United States v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 362 (1963).
14

California v. Am. Stores, 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990).
4

in terms of probabilities.15 The Brown Shoe v. United States, the Court stated the standard as
requiring a showing of only a “reasonable probability,” “appreciable danger,”16 or “reasonable
likelihood17 of anticompetitive harm—a showing that is less than that which a plaintiff must
make to establish a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.18 Section 7 requires a “prediction
of its impact upon competitive conditions in the future.”19 As Judge Posner wrote in FTC v.
Elders Grain, Inc., “doubts are to be resolved against the transaction” in making this
prediction.20 Thus, it is not necessary for the government to show that the merger is more likely
than not to lessen competition, only that there is “a reasonable probability” or “appreciable
danger” that it will do so.21
In decision theoretic terms, this incipiency standard amounts to placing greater value on
avoiding harmful mergers (false negatives) over preventing beneficial mergers (false
positives)—i.e., it is better to err on the side of over-deterrence rather than under-deterrence.22
This is not to say that false positives do not matter, only that false negatives matter more.23
There are several economic reasons for placing greater emphasis on avoiding false
negatives. First, the cost of false negatives is the long-term competitive harm. In contrast, the
cost of false positives is the loss of efficiencies and synergies, which often can be mitigated or
eliminated through internal growth by the buyer or the acquisition of the target by a buyer that
raises less competitive concern. Second, merging firms anticipating increased profits from
15

See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294 at 323; Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 at 363. A separate
interpretation of the incipiency standard is that a trend towards increasing concentration in a market
enables the acquisition and exercise of increasing market power and should be thwarted before such
power is realized. Brown Shoe at 323.

16

Hospital Corp of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 https://casetext.com/case/hospital-corp-of-

america-v-ftc(7th Cir 1986).
17

United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 171 (1964); United States v. Marine Bancorp, Inc., 418
U.S. 602, 622-23 https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-marine-bancorporation (1974).
18

Id. at 323 n.39.

19

Phil. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 at 362.

20

FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989).

21

For a recent summary statement, see Mem. Opinion, U.S. v. Bertelsmann SE & Co., 1:21CV02886
(D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2022) at 21.
22

Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach,
80 ANTITRUST L. J. 269 (2015); Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 315 (1960).
23

FTC v. Actavis places a high weight on avoiding false negatives even in the context of Section 1 and
where the likelihood of patent invalidity represented a “small risk”; as the Court explained, “the payment
… likely seeks to prevent the [small] risk of competition. And, as we have said, that consequence
constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.” 570 U.S. 136, 157 (2013).
5

market power have incentives to dramatically outspend the agency in litigation, which skews
litigation outcomes in their favor and makes false negatives more likely.24 Third, it is often
difficult for the agencies to prevent harm through consent decrees because the merging firms
have informational advantages in those negotiations.
This analysis of incipiency and false negatives also is relevant for LTF. In United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Court opined that “all doubts as to the remedy are to be
resolved in [the government’s] favor.”25 While that case involved a remedy after liability had
been found, the point remains relevant here when the structure of existing pre-merger
competition is eliminated with certainty and the claim that the divestiture or conduct remedy will
prevent harms from that lost competition is speculative.
False negative concerns likely are increased by a more permissive (i.e., defendant
friendly) LTF procedure. The historical evidence suggests that negotiated consent decrees have
often been insufficient.26 An FTC self-study found a worrisome number of consents to be
failures or achieved success only after substantial delays.27 If LTF leads courts to ratify LTF
proposals that are even weaker than those rejected by the agency, the risk of false positives will
be decreased but the risk of false negatives will be exacerbated.
An LTF procedure that provides the agencies with inadequate notice or excessive
evidentiary burden would lead to similar concerns regarding underenforcement. In addition to
the risk of losses at trial, a more permissive LTF procedure would cause the agency to have less
relative bargaining leverage in negotiating consent decrees, which would tend to lead to weaker
consent decrees and under-deterrence of merger proposals that raise significant anticompetitive
risks.
Based on the history of antitrust enforcement against mergers, the content of Section 7,
and our economic and decision theoretic analysis, we recommend that courts adjudicating
proposed remedies adopt case management procedures to safeguard against competitive harm.
Our proposal addresses four important procedural features: (i) timing and notice of the parties’
remedy proposal, (ii) definitiveness of the proposal, (iii) evidentiary burdens placed on the
parties, and (iv) certainty of execution and enforcement of the remedy. We also suggest several
possible refinements to the procedure, including exclusion of certain types of remedy proposals.
Since this procedure can be mandated by a district court, additional legislation is unnecessary.

24

Infra, Section III.

25

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 366 U.S. 316, 334 (1961).

26

Infra, Section III.

27

Fed. Trade Comm'n, The FTC's Merger Remedies 2006-2012: A Report of the Bureaus of Competition
and Economics, at 7 (Jan. 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ftcsmerger-remedies-2006-2012-report-bureau-competition-economics/p143100_ftc_merger_remedies_20062012.pdf [https://perma.cc/DLS2-AW7N] [hereinafter “FTC STUDY”].
6

We appreciate the rationale for prohibiting all LTF proposals. Allowing LTF can
encourage the parties to hide competitive problems rather than voluntarily disclosing and
remedying problems in the transaction that is notified in their HSR filing. This failure to selfdisclose problems increases costs and raises the risk of the agency overlooking the problem,
thereby increasing the risk of false negatives. It also increases the likelihood of false negatives
by reducing agency bargaining leverage. However, because the merging parties always have the
option of withdrawing their HSR submission and filing an HSR for an amended agreement, they
will always have an opportunity for a second bite of the apple. Thus, a complete prohibition of
LTF would make little practical difference.
We therefore recommend that courts entertain LTF proposals, even those made after a
complaint is filed. We do not require the parties to file a new HSR submission when they
propose to LTF. Instead, we propose a parallel case-management process for LTF, whereby the
parties would be required to make a “remedy filing” (analogous to an HSR notification) that
details the parties ’proposed remedial provisions with specificity and then permit the agencies to
issue an information request (analogous to a second request) within 30 days. After the parties
certify compliance with the information request, the court would mandate a second waiting
period (again, analogous to the HSR process) before the commencement of the trial proceedings.
This process will ensure that the agencies have sufficient time and opportunity to engage in
discovery to investigate a definite proposal and the court to have adequate information to
evaluate the effects. These additional delays also will incentivize earlier voluntary disclosure.
Our procedure focuses on the effect of the merger as modified by the proposed remedy.
But we nonetheless recommend that the government be permitted to satisfy its prima facie
evidentiary burden by focusing on the merger as proposed. Specifically, we recommend that the
government be deemed to have met its burden by (i) establishing that the transaction would meet
satisfy structural presumption under the assumption that the buyer hypothetically were to acquire
all the seller’s assets and there were no other remedies, or (ii) providing sufficient other
evidence. We make this recommendation because there are numerous technological, managerial
and market reasons why the divestee would not provide the same competitive intensity as did the
seller. In addition, the merging firm chooses the divestee and has the incentive to choose a weak
divestee that will not constrain its market power. These competitive issues reinforce the
overriding concerns about false negatives.
The defendant can then rebut the prima facie case by showing either that concentration is
improperly measured or by providing other evidence that its remedy or other factors will make
competitive harm unlikely. We recommend that the court require defendants to produce
substantial rebuttal evidence to ensure a high degree of confidence before accepting the
defendant’s rebuttal claims.
Promises to operate different vertical divisions of a vertically integrated firm as though
the businesses are separate entities or with non-discrimination promises conflict with economic
incentives and so should only be accepted if they involve legally binding commitments,
7

including specific behavioral constraints, and if the firm’s compliance over time can be verified
by the court with confidence. Furthermore, we strongly recommend that promises to maintain
competition among divisions of a corporation be excluded from consideration altogether. Such
remedies are unenforceable and are wholly inconsistent with Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp.28 and United States v. Trenton Potteries,29
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part II reviews the LTF case law.
Part III reviews merger enforcement statistics and merger retrospective studies, which provide
evidence of under-enforcement. Part IV sets forth our economic analysis, which explains how
permitting unconstrained LTF increases the likelihood of insufficient remedies, weakens agency
bargaining leverage in negotiating consent decrees, and reduces deterrence. Section V presents
our proposed LTF procedure and discusses certain types of remedy proposals that courts should
treat with skepticism or not entertain at all. Section VI concludes.

II.

“Litigating the Fix” Caselaw

Defendants asking courts to allow LTF in merger litigation is not new.30 In general,
courts have been willing to adjudicate defendants’ proposed remedies and have denied motions
to exclude evidence relating to these proposals.31 Their willingness is understandable: if the
circumstances surrounding a merger have changed, the court should analyze those changed
circumstances, even if the remedial proposal is made after the complaint is filed. As the district
court explained in FTC v. Libbey,32
Operating on what appears to be a clear slate, the Court concludes that parties
to a merger agreement that is being challenged by the government can abandon
that agreement and propose a new one in an effort to address the government’s
concerns. And when they do so under circumstances as occurred in this case,
it becomes the new agreement that the Court must evaluate in deciding whether
an injunction should be issued.33
28

467 U.S. 752 (1984).

29

273 U.S. 392 (1927).

30

Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co., No. 77 C 2800, 1977 WL 1491, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (explaining that
defendant’s offer of a curative would not be credited, since it was made without specificity during a
hearing); see also Consol. Gold Fields, P.L.C. v. Anglo Am. Corp. of S. Afr. Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 487, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).

31

See, e.g., Gelfand & Brannon, supra note 9; see also RAG-Stiftung, 436 F. Supp. 3d 278; UHG/Change,
1:22CV00481 (D.D.C. 2022); Penguin Random House/Simon & Schuster, 1:21CV02886 (D.D.C. 2022).

32

211 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002).

33

Id. at 46; see also Mem. Opinion Denying FTC's Motion In Limine, FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., No.
1:04CV00534, at 7 (D.D.C. July 7, 2004) (on file with authors) (”Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires
the Court to review the entire transaction in question.”).
8

From the LTF case law, three issues have emerged as most salient: (i) the timing of the
remedy proposal and the extent to which it provides the antitrust agency with sufficient notice,
(ii) the definitiveness of the proffered remedy, and (iii) the assignment of the parties’ respective
evidentiary burdens.

A.

Timing and Sufficient Notice

District courts have been willing to consider evidence relating to defendants’ proffered
remedy when the timing of the proposal provides the agency sufficient time to consider it, even
if the formal proposal is made after the complaint is issued. For example, in Libbey, the
defendants amended their merger agreement about one month after the FTC filed its complaint.
The amended agreement provided that Libbey would no longer purchase Anchor’s food service
business. In response, the FTC voted out an amended complaint. The district court rejected the
FTC’s argument that the defendants were seeking to “evade FTC and judicial review,”
concluding instead that the defendants were attempting to address the FTC’s concerns, and
noting that the agency remained capable of vetting, and indeed did vet, the merger as modified. 34
Similarly, in United States v. United Healthgroup, Inc. (UHG/Change),35 the court found
that the defendants’ proposal provided the agency with sufficient time to evaluate the revised
merger. The defendants proposed a divestiture, a firewall, and other commitments before the
DOJ filed its complaint and subsequently reached a somewhat revised, signed divestiture
agreement post-complaint, and the agency had more than four months to conduct discovery
before the hearing. The court rejected the DOJ’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the
revised remedy proposal and ultimately found the remedy sufficient to avoid liability. 36
In FTC v. Arch Coal, the defendants proposed a divestiture; the FTC rejected the
proposal and filed a complaint two months later seeking a preliminary injunction. 37 The court
denied the FTC’s motion in limine, seeking to exclude evidence relating to the proffered
divestiture, concluding that “the FTC remained capable of vetting the amended agreement and
had in fact voted to enjoin the amended merger agreement. . . . Thus, the FTC has assessed and is
in reality challenging the merger agreement including [the proposed changes to the initial
merger].”38

34

Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d 34 at 46.

35

Redacted Mem. Opinion, United States v. Unitedhealth Group, Inc., 1:22CV00481 (D.D.C. 2022).

36

Id. at 10.

37

Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 at 114. In May 2003, Arch Coal agreed to acquire Triton, with assets
that included two mines. In July 2003, the parties made their HSR notification, and, in August 2003, the
FTC issued a second request. In response to the FTC’s concerns, Arch signed an agreement to sell one of
the Triton mines in January 2004. After further analysis, the FTC filed a motion for preliminary
injunction in April 2004 seeking to enjoin Arch from consummating the acquisition.

38

Mem. Opinion Denying FTC's Motion In Limine, No. 1:04CV00534 (D.D.C. July 7, 2004).
9

In contrast, when remedies have been proposed very late in the process, courts have been
less willing to entertain them. For example, in FTC v. Ardagh, defendant proposed its remedy in
the eleventh hour and the court refused to allow introduction of evidence relating to it. 39 And in
Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co., a private case, the court likewise refused to consider evidence
relating to a remedy proposal that was submitted during the hearing. 40 In United States v.
Franklin Electric Co., the court permitted evidence of a proposed post-acquisition third-party
licensing scheme that was proferred before trial, but the defendant amended the proposal several
times throughout the trial and the court ultimately rejected it. 41

B.

Definitiveness

Courts similarly have been unwilling to consider proposals that are too indefinite for the
agency and court reliably to evaluate. In Ardagh, for example, the defendant had not identified a
buyer of the assets to be divested or a plan for how those assets would be employed in the market
to maintain competition.42 The district court concluded that it would not consider defendant’s
remedy, explaining “I just don't think the negotiations are far enough along the line, and I don't
think it's fair to the other side to ask them to do that.”43

C.

Evidentiary Burdens

A decision that the court will adjudicate the modified transaction, rather than the one the
parties notified under HSR, does not automatically determine how the court will allocate the
litigants’ evidentiary burdens or how it should apply the merger litigation structural presumption.
Must the agency as a part of its prima facie case establish that the defendants’ proposal does not
resolve the anticompetitive issues the merger raises? Or is the burden, instead, on the defendants
to establish that the proffered remedy resolves the potential anticompetitive effects of the merger

39
40
41

See Transcript of Pre-Hearing Conference, FTC v. Ardagh, No. 13-1021 (D.D.C. 2013) at Tr. 13:19-25.
No. 77 C 2800, 1977 WL 1491 at *7 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1026 (W.D. Wis. 2000).

42

See Transcript of Pre-Hearing Conference, supra note 8, at Tr. 14:17- 15:1 (Ardagh conceding it had
not identified a buyer, the sale price of the assets, or whether the plants could be combined into a viable
business); 21:12-17 (Ardagh’s counsel stating that there is not yet a binding contract but a sale is being
negotiated); 28:6-23 (Ardagh’s counsel stating that the firm is negotiating with two or three potential
buyers).

43

See id. at Tr. 29:10-22; see also id. 35:20-22 (“[W]e will not be discussing any divestiture of plants that
one side sort of knows about and the other side doesn’t.”); cf. Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co., No. 77 C
2800, 1977 WL 1491, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 8, 1977) (refusing to credit defendant’s divestiture offer in suit
by target of hostile takeover against firm making the tender offer, explaining that the offer was made
during a hearing without specificity, and that undefined proposals should not be considered in the midst
of a preliminary injunction hearing). But see Arch Coal, Mem. Opinion (denying FTC’s motion in limine
to exclude evidence regarding defendants’ proposed remedy and rejecting FTC’s argument the divestiture
agreement was not definitive and could be renegotiated).
10

as initially proposed? Regarding the structural presumption,44 where the proposed remedy
includes a divestiture, should the court calculate market concentration using the merging firms’
pre-merger market shares, such that the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the merger,
as modified, is not likely to substantially lessen competition if the structural presumption is
satisfied? Or should the court assume the proposed divestiture will restore competition to premerger levels and, consequently, calculate market concentration using the post-divestiture
market shares? There is no consensus among the district courts on these issues.
There are nuanced issues regarding how courts should treat proposed divestiture
remedies. The issue of burden allocation is intimately bound up with the applicability of the
structural presumption based on pre-merger market concentration. Judge Nichols raised this
precise issue in UHG/Change.45 The court’s preferred position was that the proposed divestiture
made the structural presumption inapplicable, so the government would have the burden to prove
its prima facie case with non-structural evidence rather than the presumption. In contrast, the
government argued that the structural presumption should apply, based on market shares that
were not modified to account for the proposed remedy. Without determining the burden issue,
the court chose to use the government’s preferred approach and then found for the parties under
this more pro-plaintiff standard. Treating the large increase in the “unremedied” HHI as
satisfying the prima facie case under the United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.46 burden-shifting
approach, the court then analyzed the evidence and concluded that the parties had carried their
burden to rebut DOJ’s structural case based on the proposed remedy.47
As we discuss in detail below,48 we do not recommend that courts adopte Judge Nichols’
approach. Most courts have placed the burden on defendants to establish that their proffered
remedies would nullify the anticompetitive effects that would otherwise result from the merger.
In FTC v. Sysco Corp. 49 and United States v. Aetna Inc.,50 the district courts applied the
structural presumption to the merger as originally notified in the HSR filing and assigned
defendants the rebuttal burden of establishing the proposed divestiture was sufficient to maintain
competition. In Sysco, the defendants’ proposed remedy was divestiture of 11 distribution
centers and a commitment by the buyer of those assets to develop more distribution centers, with
the defendants arguing that the business acumen and experience of the divestiture buyer’s
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Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 at 363; Baker Hughes 908 F.2d at 982-83.
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Redacted Mem. Opinion, UHG/Change, No. 1:22CV0481 at 17-20.
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908 F. 2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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UHG/Change, No. 1:22CV0481 at 19-20, 30.
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Infra, text at n.100.
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113 F. Supp. 3d 1 at 57.
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240 F. Supp. 3d 1 at 59 (“Defendants ’next rebuttal argument is that the proposed divestiture of certain
assets to Molina Healthcare would counteract any anticompetitive effects of the merger.”).
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leadership would ensure that the divestiture replicated pre-merger competition.51 In Aetna, the
court similarly considered Aetna’s proposal to divest its Medicare Advantage business in some
geographic areas as a rebuttal argument.52 In both cases, the courts rejected the “fix,” concluding
the divestiture buyers would face impediments that would prevent them from replicating the
intensity of pre-merger competition.
In Libbey, the district court also assessed the merger as modified by a proposed remedy.
The proposed remedy provided that Libbey would no longer acquire Anchor’s food service
business and would instead only acquire Anchor’s plants and retail and specialty glassware
businesses. The surviving business would use a contract manufacturer to supply products. The
court focused on the amended merger agreement. The court was concerned that the business the
seller would have retained lacked a factory, so the seller would have needed to procure its
product from a contract manufacturer. The court found that the surviving business would face
higher costs and other competitive impediments, implying that competition likely would be
decreased. These deficiencies meant that the proposed remedy would not replicate the level of
competition pre-merger. The court then calculated the increase in concentration flowing from
the transaction as originally proposed, placing the burden on the defendants to rebut the FTC
prima facie case based on the structural presumption. The court explained,
[T]he best evidence of [the merger’s] potential effect is the impact of the
original agreement because the post-merger landscape could quite possibly
be similar to the terrain that would have been created if Libbey had acquired
all of Anchor’s business, assuming, as the FTC argues, that RCP [the
company that would have owned the retained business] may prove to be an
ineffective competitor.53
For proposed conduct remedies, the courts generally have required defendants to rebut
the agency’s evidence that the as-notified merger is sufficiently likely to be anticompetitive. For
example, in Franklin Electric, the proposed remedy was a licensing arrangement.54 The court
continued to rely on the structural presumption and placed the burden on the defendant,
explaining that “[t]he presumption the government starts with, which is that a merger of the only
two competitors in the market is a violation of § 7, remains unrebutted.55 Similarly, in FTC v.
51

Sysco, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1 at 15.

52

Aetna, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 at 70, 72-73. The court concluded that the proposed divestiture buyer lacked
the internal capacity (including IT infrastructure, personnel who can manage star ratings, and
management and staff with relevant expertise) to successfully operate the divested business. The court
was also concerned that Molina had repeatedly tried to enter the Medicare Advantage space repeatedly
but failed.
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Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 34 at 50.
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130 F. Supp. 2d 1025 at 1026.
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Id.
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CCC Holdings Inc., the proposed remedy involved revising a software license agreement
between defendant and a smaller competitor with the objective of easing the smaller competitor’s
barriers to expanding its competitive significance. The court noted that the proposed license
revision could serve as rebuttal evidence, thereby placing the burden on defendant.56

III. Merger Enforcement History Supports Concerns Regarding False
Negatives
The caselaw is useful in understanding how LTF affects the litigation dynamics of
antitrust agency challenges to mergers. But to fully appreciate the implications and proper
treatment of LTF, the procedure should be analyzed in context. Specifically, the analysis of LTF
must account for the evidence of the effectiveness of current agency merger enforcement under
the HSR process. When this evidence is considered, the implication is that LTF raises false
negative concerns.

A.

Agency Budget Constraints and Under-Enforcement

The agencies today are budget constrained, which forces them to engage in triage.57 Over
the twenty-year period from fiscal year 2001 to 2020, there were a total of 31,500 HSR filings
that reached outcomes by the end of 2020.58 Of these filings that reached outcomes, only 969
cases—about 3.1%—led to second requests and the fraction of transaction leading to second
requests has trended down. A high fraction of second requests lead to challenges. only 272
(28.1%) of these 969 cases was the merger cleared as proposed. These figures indicate that only
the most problematical transactions are investigated. Of the rest, 367 (37.9%) were resolved by
consent decrees entered simultaneously with a complaint. Another 254 (26.2%) were abandoned
or restructured, suggesting that the parties concluded that litigation was not in their interest. .
Only 77 (7.9%) of the 969 second requests were not resolved in one of these ways. Of the 77, 11
(14.3%) led to a negotiated settlement outside of the consent decree process, 34 (44.2%) were
56

605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 47 (D.D.C. 2009).
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See., e.g., Robert B. Bell and Amanda L. Butler, Institutional Factors Contributing to the UnderEnforcement of Merger Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE 7-8 (October 2020); Michael Kades, The State of U.S.
Antitrust Enforcement (2019) at Tables 7-9, available at https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/thestate-of-u-s-federal-antitrust-enforcement/?longform=true [https://perma.cc/84EV-VRSN]; Appropriation
Figures for the Antitrust Division: Fiscal Years 1903-2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/appropriation-figures-antitrust-division [https://perma.cc/84EV-VRSN];
Testimony of Daniel Francis, The U.S. Senate Committee on The Judiciary Subcommittee on
Competition Policy, Antitrust, And Consumer Rights (Feb. 2, 2022), available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/daniel-francis-2222-testimony [https://perma.cc/3KLUJEPL].
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For a more detailed description and analysis of this data see Logan Billman & Steven C. Salop, Merger
Enforcement Statistics: 2001-2020, __ ANTITRUST L.J. __ (2022?)
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abandoned or restructured, while 3 (3.9%) were withdrawn by the agency as mooted. Only 29
cases (37.7% of the 77) reached a litigated decision, and the government won 18 (62.1%) while
losing 11 (37.9%).
The Biden DOJ most recently has begun to change its policy. In fiscal year 2022, it
issued 12 complaints but only 5 of these were settled simultaneously with consent decrees.59 Of
the rest, 1 was subsequently abandoned and 6 went to trial. The DOJ lost 3 and won 1 of the
cases at trial, while 2 others are still pending. The FTC had remained focused on consent
decrees. In fiscal year 2022, it issued 18 complaints and 9 of these were settled simultaneously
with consent decrees.60 Of the rest, 5 was subsequently abandoned and 3 were subsequently
settled with consent decrees. Only Illumina/Grail went to trial and the ALJ found for the
parties.61 The case is now pending before the Commission.

B.

Insufficient Consent Decrees

A consent decree does not ensure that competition will be preserved. There have been
some striking examples of failed divestitures. When Safeway and Albertsons merged, the FTC
consent decree required divestiture of 168 stores.62 Haggens, a chain of 18 stores, acquired 146
of these stores. Later that year, Haggens declared bankruptcy, and the FTC subsequently
approved Albertson’s re-acquisition of 29 of the stores.63
Hertz’s acquisition of Dollar Thrifty in 2012 is also illustrative. Hertz agreed to divest its
Advantage rental car business and to supply vehicles to Advantage for a period of time.64
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The agency annual reports were not issued at the time of this writing, so these figures may not be
perfectly accurate.
60

The agency annual reports were not issued at the time of this writing, so these figures may not be
perfectly accurate.
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In re Illumina, Inc. and GRAIL, Inc., Docket No. 9401 (Sept. 9, 2022).
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This divestiture included more than one-quarter of the 630 stores owned by Albertson’s pre-merger,
though some divested stores were not Albertson’s. Press Release, FTC, FTC Requires Albertsons and
Safeway to Sell 168 Stores as a Condition of Merger (Jan. 27, 2015), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2015/01/ftc-requires-albertsons-safeway-sell-168stores-condition-merger [https://perma.cc/WZ8M-MSBM].
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Bankrupt Haggen’s $106M Store Sale to Albertsons OK’d, Law360 (Mar. 29, 2016), available at
https://www.law360.com/articles/777361/bankrupt-haggen-s-106m-store-sale-to-albertsons-ok-d
[https://perma.cc/JFN5-3E5K].
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Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Modified Final Order in Hertz Acquisition of Dollar Thrifty (Jul.
11, 2013), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2013/07/ftc-approvesmodified-final-order-hertz-acquisition-dollar-thrifty [https://perma.cc/2Z8J-5UUW].
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Advantage declared bankruptcy some months after the final order, and the FTC permitted Hertz and
Avis to purchase some of its airport locations.65
The FTC’s 2017 self-study reports more systematic evidence of insufficient consent
decrees. The study analyzed a significant number of (unidentified) mergers settled with consent
decrees between 2006 and 2012.66 The study found that many orders were insufficient.67
Among all horizontal merger consent decrees, 19% failed to restore or preserve competition.68
Another 15% were only “qualified successes” because they took longer than 2 to 3 years to
restore competition.69 Together, these data indicate there was some significant competitive harm
suffered in 34% of the consents. Even eliminating remedies in consummated horizontal mergers,
19% were considered as “failures” and another 6% were only “qualified successes.” Divestitures
of entire ongoing businesses were more successful than those that involved only the sale of
“selected assets.”70 By the FTC’s definition, 100% of the orders involving divestitures of
ongoing businesses were “successes.”71 But only 56% of the “selected asset” orders were
“successes” and 33% were “failures.”72 All in all, this evidence suggests a significant number of
false negatives, where the FTC accepted a remedy that did not adequately address the merger’s
anticompetitive effects.
Behavioral remedies are generally less likely to succeed than divestitures because
behavioral remedies are unable to cover all the potential conduct of the merging firms and
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Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Franchise Services of North America’s Application to Sell Certain
Advantage Rent a Car Locations to Hertz and Avis Budget Group (May 30, 2014), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-approves-franchise-services-north-americasapplication-sell-certain-advantage-rent-car-locations [https://perma.cc/Y8G9-ALDB].
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Another 11% were considered qualified successes. Id.
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because they are difficult to enforce.73 Of the remedies the FTC examined in its study, four
included information firewalls in the context of vertical mergers; the agency deemed all four
successful, although the staff’s main measure of success was "whether respondents effectively
monitored and enforced them.”74 Relying on the fox to monitor and report whether it raided the
henhouse is a poor way to enforce a remedy and an equally poor way to gauge its success.75
That only 66% of the reported mergers were classified as “successes” suggests that the
agencies approve consent decrees that entail insufficient likelihood of preserving competition.76
The FTC did not report if these “successes” increased competition or simply prevented
competition from worsening. But if one assumes the latter, and considers those cases together
with the 34% of instances where market outcomes worsened (some for 2 to 3 years and some
longer), these data raise the question of whether the set of evaluated remedies have led on
average to worse market outcomes than would have been the case in a counterfactual where all
of the mergers were prohibited, an issue the FTC study did not address.
A weaker remedy may be appropriate if the risk of anticompetitive effects from the
merger is low. But agencies may feel compelled to accept potentially insufficient consent
decrees even in more worrisome cases because constrained agency budgets limit the amount of
litigation the agencies can undertake. Losing a trial, with the merger going forward with no
remedy at all, is worse for competition than a somewhat insufficient settlement. The financial
returns to completing an anticompetitive merger are very high; defendants therefore have an
incentive to devote significant resources to litigation—more than a budget-constrained agency
can devote. These asymmetric stakes and budgets tend to skew litigation outcomes away from
the merits in favor of the merging firms and thus increase false negatives.77
73

Merger Remedies Manual, Antitrust Division: U.S. Department of Justice at 4 (Sept. 2020), available
at https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1312416/download [https://perma.cc/48X6-SNS8] (“Conduct
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16

These are the general circumstances facing the agencies and merging parties in litigation.
And as we explain below, LTF further influences these dynamics.

IV. Economic Analysis of LTF Impact on Trial Outcomes, Consent Decrees,
and Merger Proposals
LTF raises additional concerns about false negatives. As discussed, history suggests that
there is underenforcement in merger reviews from resource constraints and negotiated consent
decrees often are not fully successful. Allowing parties to propose even weaker LTF proposals
to the court (and have some probability of winning) will further reduce the agency’s bargaining
leverage in consent decree negotiations, leading to even weaker negotiated consent decrees.
There will also be reduced deterrence of proposals for mergers with significant anticompetitive
risks.
These false negative concerns and the potentially exacerbating effects of LTF can be
explained by analyzing the five stages of the HSR process. In stage 1, the firm decides how
much antitrust enforcement risk to assume for the merger it will propose, as gauged by the
probability and magnitude of the merger’s anticompetitive effects. For simplicity, we assume
the reviewing agency issues a second request. In stage 2, the agency either clears the merger as
notified or accepts a consent decree that may be more or less substantial in changing the terms of
the transaction.78 In stage 3, the firm either accepts or rejects a negotiated consent decree.79 In
stage 4A, the firm may abandon (or restructure) the transaction or proceed to court with without
an LTF proposal . Assuming it proposes an LTF, in stage 4B, the agency may file a motion in
limine (and we assume that it will), which the court either grants or denies. In stage 5, there is a
trial and an outcome.
These decision stages and choices are summarized in the Figure below.

Knowledge that the court will deny the motion in limine in stage 4B and permit LTF will
affect behavior and outcomes at every earlier stage of the process. Because behavior at every
78

We put aside the issue of the agency simply moving directly to trial.

79

At this point, the agency might withdraw its complaint, or the parties might renegotiate, but these
possibilities can be ignored here.
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stage depends on the anticipated outcomes at later stages, it is useful to focus first on the last
stage and then work backwards. That is, the participants and analysts must “look ahead and
reason back.”80
Assuming that an LTF remedy is proposed and the motion in limine is denied (stage 4B),
an imperfectly informed court (stage 5) may, at trial, end up accepting a firm’s LTF remedy that
would lead to a substantially more anticompetitive outcome than would occur absent the
merger.81 This “false negative” outcome is more likely if the LTF procedure is more permissive.
While “false positives” may be reduced somewhat, “false negatives” are of greater concern under
Section 7’s incipiency standard.82
The effects of an agency’s increased risk of a loss at trial from a more permissive
procedure that makes a court more likely to accept a firm’s LTF remedy can be traced back to
earlier stages of the process. If the firm anticipates that the court will deny the motion in limine
(stage 4B), it will have incentives(and be more likely) to reject the agency’s proposed consent
decree (stage 3) and propose its own, weaker LTF remedy (stage 4A) and be less likely to
abandon the transaction (stage 4A).83 This analysis all stems from the fact that a more
permissive (i.e., more defendant-friendly) LTF procedure makes it more likely that the court will
ultimately accept the firm’s possibly weak remedy rather than enjoin the merger (stage 5).
Most importantly, such a permissive LTF procedure will also likely lead the agency to
accept a weaker consent decree (stage 2) for two reasons. First, the agency will perceive a greater
probability of losing at trial because the remedy likely will be seen as less anticompetitive than
the unremedied merger. Second, the agency will understand that it has less downside risk
because a loss at trial at least achieves the LTF remedy.84 The merging firm also can anticipate
that its higher chance of winning at trial will lead the agency to accept a weaker consent decree
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Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, THINKING STRATEGICALLY, THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS,
POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 34 (1991).
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Suppose that the merger as remedied is anticompetitive, but less anticompetitive than the merger as
proposed. Since the trial court faces imperfect information, it is reasonable to expect that it will more
likely permit the remedied merger than it would the more anticompetitive as-proposed merger, despite
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(stages 2-3). LTF will also incentivize the firm to propose mergers that have higher risk of
harming competition (stage 1).
A more permissive LTF procedure increases false negatives in a second way—by
incentivizing merging firms to hide potential competitive problems rather than self-disclosing by
notifying a transaction in the original HSR filing that contains a proposed divestiture, leaving
certain assets with the seller, or other remedy. Allowing late-stage LTF proposals also
incentivizes firms to attempt to gain a litigation advantage by reducing the amount of time and
information available to the agencies to investigate the proposed remedy.
In short, a more permissive LTF procedure weakens the agency’s relative litigation
position and bargaining leverage while strengthening the merging firm’s.85 These changes lead
to more false negatives, weaker consent decrees, and less deterrence of anticompetitive merger
proposals. It also may lengthen the investigation period.
A different type of false negative concerns led to passage of the HSR Act. The Act
provided procedural solution to an under-enforcement problem that stemmed from the
enforcement agencies lacking sufficient notice and time to evaluate and attempt to block
anticompetitive mergers before they were consummated, leading to what Kenneth Elzinga called
“pyrrhic” victories.86 The HSR Act reduced these twin problems of “midnight mergers” and
“unscrambling the eggs” by requiring pre-merger notification, second requests, and waiting
periods.87 A procedural solution similarly can reduce the type of false negative concerns raised
by LTF.

V. Proposed Procedure
Our proposal is designed to permit courts to consider LTF proposals and evidence while
avoiding excessive false negatives. Our recommendations are driven by our economic analysis,
the language and goals of Section 7, LTF case law, and the history of negotiated consent decrees.
We appreciate the rationale for prohibiting LTF proposals.88 Permitting LTF encourages
the parties to hide competitive problems, rather than self-disclosing them, perhaps by reporting a
transaction in the original HSR filing that is structured to avoid competitive concerns. This nondisclosure and post-complaint LTF proposals may increase agency investigation costs. It also
85

For a sample of the technical literature, see John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA
155 (1950); Ken Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, 17 RAND J. ECON.
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raises the risk of false negatives by reducing the agency’s bargaining leverage and allowing the
defendant to bet on the court erring in its favor, or even tailoring the LTF proposal according to
the judge assigned to the case.
However, we believe that, as a practical matter, prohibiting post-complaint LTF
proposals would not make much difference for several reasons. Even if LTF were prohibited,
the parties could always withdraw the old agreement and file a new HSR notification; they
would therefore still have a practical opportunity for a second bite of the apple at little additional
cost.89 Moreover, significant benefits from the merging party self-disclosing potential
competitive issues may not be realized. For example, it often will be impossible to line up a
divestiture buyer in advance of filing the HSR, particularly if the divestiture transaction is made
contingent on the agency demanding it. As a legal matter, courts have the right to fashion
remedies and have routinely adjudicated merger remedy proposals; and we see no legal bar to
them adjudicating such proposals.90 Thus, we do not recommend prohibiting LTF.
Instead, we recommend a policy that requires a process of discovery and waiting periods
that is analogous to the HSR process. This will prevent the agency from having too little time or
information to evaluate potential shortcomings with the proposed remedy and may encourage
some earlier self-disclosure to avoid later delays. To avoid false negatives, our recommended
policy places evidentiary burdens on the merging parties to show that the fix is sufficient to
preserve competition.

A. Basic Proposal
Our basic procedure has the following features: (i) it provides ample time for agency
investigation; (ii) it ensures that the agency and court have sufficient information regarding a
definitive remedy proposal; and (iii) it allocates the evidentiary burden to the merging parties to
establish that the proposal is sufficient to eliminate anticompetitive effects, even in cases
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One difference is that there is no filing fee under our proposal. But we do not expect that a $280,000
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divestiture.
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involving divestitures or the seller retaining certain assets. It also includes provisions that a court
can apply to post-judgment enforcement.
1. Timing and Sufficient Notice
Suppose that the proposed remedy is not reflected in the original HSR notification. To
ensure that the agency receives sufficient notice and time to evaluate the proposed remedy, we
recommend that as part of its case management order, the court require the merging parties to
submit a “remedy filing” that articulates the terms of the remedy. We recommend a process that
is very similar to the HSR process. The remedy filing would trigger a thirty-day waiting period
(analogous to the HSR waiting period) during which the agency would gain compulsory process
and the power to issue a subpoena for further information (analogous to a second request). The
briefing and trial would then be delayed (and the parties would not be permitted to close the
deal) for a sufficient period determined by the court (analogous to the HSR waiting period) after
compliance with the subpoena.91
This procedure could cause some delays if the proposal comes late in the process. But
the merging parties can mitigate delays by disclosing the LTF remedy earlier in the process and
beginning to collect the relevant information during the initial thirty-day period.92 Thus, the fear
of delays has benefits. If the transaction reported in the original HSR submission resolves the
potential competitive concerns (e.g., with a a divestiture), that would avoid any delay in a
subsequent litigation. Earlier disclosure to avoid later delay would result in the agency and the
merging parties possessing more common knowledge, thereby reducing the parties’ reliance on
trial to resolve these uncertainties.93
2. Definitiveness
To ensure the agencies have sufficient information to review the remedy, we recommend
that the parties be required to specify the proposed remedy in detail. In the case of a divestiture,
the filing should identify the divesture buyer; the assets included in the divestiture package; the
terms of the agreement; any post-divestiture dealings or other entanglements between the
merging party and the divestiture buyer(or seller in the case of retained assets) s (e.g., input
supplies, duties to deal, pricing terms, non-competition or no-poach agreements); and any
contractual or behavioral restrictions or other promises.94 We also recommend that the filing
specify how the remedy will be enforced, how its implementation will be monitored, the
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If the remedy involves the seller retaining certain assets that compete with the buyer, the filing should
contain similar details.
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sanctions that will be levied if the merging party fails to comply with its commitments, and any
process for modifying the remedy if it fails or alterations are necessary to promote its success.95
3. Evidentiary Burdens
The allocation of the evidentiary burdens is the most contentious issue with the LTF
procedure. We agree that the court must adjudicate the merger as modified, rather than the one
notified in the original HSR submission. However, this focus does not determine the proper
allocation of the burden of proof between the government and the merging parties. The
evidentiary burdens in a merger case are sensitive to whether the structural presumption applies
and demands for LTF will typically arise when the presumption would apply. For this reason,
we focus on transactions where the structural presumption would apply if the buyer obtained all
the seller’s competing assets.
Even if the focus is placed on the merger as modified, one possible approach would
amount to a two-stage process of liability and remedy. In stage 1, legality of the unremedied
merger would be evaluated with the ultimate burden of persuasion placed on the government.
This stage would be relevant because the parties typically argue that the original merger did not
violate Section 7, not simply that the remedy resolves all competitive concerns. If the
unmodified merger is found to violate Section 7, the remedy would be evaluated in stage 2 with
the evidentiary burden placed on the defendant. Another possible approach would be to treat the
fix as effectively a provision in an amended merger agreement, whereby the burden is placed on
the government to show that this amended agreement violates Section 7.
Our recommendation is in-between, but closer to the first approach. In the context of the
Baker Hughes burden-shifting approach, the government can satisfy its Step 1, prima facie case
of harm to competition either with the structural presumption (using the pre-merger market
shares of the merging firms without regard to a structural remedy) or other evidence. We
explain in detail below why we recommend that the original shares be used. If the government
satisfies its burden, the court places the evidentiary burden on the defendant to show the
sufficiency of the remedy, in combination with any other rebuttal arguments.96
The burden-shifting approach would be imposed on the defendant in cases where the
parties propose a remedy consisting of the seller retaining certain competing assets, such as in
Libbey, as well as divestitures, such as in Arch Coal or Sysco. This burden also would apply to
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If the remedy is proposed before a court is involved, including all these disclosures would prevent
further delays later in the process.
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See, e.g., United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 60 (D.D.C. 2017) (”In rebuttal, a defendant
may introduce evidence that a proposed divestiture would ’restore [the] competition’ lost by the merger
counteracting the anticompetitive effects of the merger”); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 137
n.15 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that defendants ”bear the burden of showing that [the remedy] would negate
any anticompetitive effects of the merger.”).
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behavioral (conduct) remedies.97 It would apply both to proposed remedies that are conditioned
on the merger being found not to violate Section 7 and also when the remedy is implemented kis
not conditioned.
There are numerous economic reasons why a divestiture or retention of certain competing
assets would not sufficiently replace the competitive intensity of the parties absent the merger,
This sufficient replacement should not be assumed. Our proposed procedure—with the
defendant having the burden to show that its remedy will prevent anticompetitive harm—also
reflects our view that there should be more concern about false negatives than false positives in
adjudicating LTF, given the history of insufficient consent decrees, the Section 7 incipiency
standard, and our economic analysis. This includes the fact that defendants have incentives to
outspend the agencies in litigation, which skews litigation outcomes in their favor. Our
recommendation also reflects the reality that the merging parties have proposed the remedy and
have incentives to choose divestiture buyers that will compete less intensely than the divesture
seller did or conduct remedies that provide only limited constraints on their behavior.
Consider the usual case in which the merging parties propose a divestiture as part of their
amended merger agreement presented to the court. In this situation, they may argue that the
HSR structural presumption is not satisfied because the divestiture prevents any increase in
concentration. Absent the presumption, the argument would go, the burden should be placed on
the government to show likely anticompetitive harm with other evidence. This approach is the
one that Judge Nichols preferred in UHG/Change—with the government allocated the burden as
part obaf its prima facie case to show that the divestiture is insufficient to restore competition.98
While we agree that the court should adjudicate the merger as amended by the
divestiture, we do not recommend Judge Nichol’s preferred approach. The economic issue is
whether the divestiture buyer will, in fact, have the ability and incentive to sufficiently replace
the competitive intensity of the acquired firm. This is the key issue identified by the courts.99
But there is no economic basis simply to presume at the outset that the divesture buyer
will do so and place the initial burden on the government to rebut that presumption. Divestitures
97

Divestitures or behavioral commitments proposed to cure proven competitive effects in mergers that
have already been consummated (e.g., Evanston/Northwestern) would also be deemed remedies for which
the defendants have the burden to demonstrate adequacy. See Initial Decision, Re Polypore International
Inc., Docket No. 9327 (Mar. 1, 2010) at 337 (discussing the alternative remedy after concluding that the
transaction was anticompetitive). Behavioral remedies proposed as part of an amended merger agreement
also would be treated in the same way. Those remedies amount to claims that the remedial duties or
restrictions will prevent the merged firm from acting on the anticompetitive incentives possibly created by
the merger. Redacted Mem. Opinion, UHG/Change, 1:22CV00481 at 39 (discussing how the proposed
remedy will provide an alternative set of incentives to avoid anticompetitive behavior).
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UHG/Change, Redacted Mem. Opinion, No. 1:22CV0481 at 17-20.
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Sysco, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1 at 72 (quoting Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy
Guide to Merger Remedies 5 (Oct. 2004)).
23

do not necessarily create a new competitor that will provide equal (or sufficiently close)
competitive intensity to that of the acquired firm pre-merger.100 Moreover, that the merging
party chooses the divestee, and has an incentive to choose a weaker competitor reinforces the
concern that the divesture buyer will provide substantially less competitive intensity than
occurred before the merger with independent competition by the divestiture seller. Thus, an
approach of automatically assuming and predicting that a proposed divestiture101 will sufficiently
replace the lost competition, and consequently exploding the structural presumption, suffers from
serious economic and legal flaws.102
The likely competitive intensity post-divestiture will depend on the facts. The divesture
buyer may be a weaker competitor for various economic reasons: higher costs, lower quality, or
less experienced or proficient executives and employees, and so on, as noted in the cases
discussed below.103 The risk that the divesture buyer will be a weaker competitor may be even
greater if there is a divestiture of selected assets rather than an ongoing104￼ The conditions for
100

As summarized by the court in RAG-Stiftung, “To evaluate whether a divestiture will do so, courts
consider the likelihood of the divestiture; the experience of the divestiture buyer; the scope of the
divestiture, the independence of the divestiture buyer from the merging seller, and the purchase price.”
RAG-Stiftung, 436 F. Supp. 3d 278 at 304 (citing Aetna, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 at 60-74).
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This same analysis applies when the acquired firm retains certain competing assets after the merger.
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For this reason, our recommendation does not conflict either with the text of Section 7 or Baker
Hughes, as suggested by Judge Nichols in UHG/Change, Redacted Mem. Opinion, No. 1:22CV0481 at
18-19. As discussed above, supra Part III, the Section 7 standard is whether the merger “may be”
substantially to lessen competition, a qualifier that Judge Nichols left out, and which translates into a
predictive concept of “reasonable probability” or “appreciable danger.” The Baker Hughes court never
suggested that “reasonable probability” should be equated with “more likely than not” or that the
structural presumption should be exploded rather than weakened. As explained by Judge Pan in the
Penguin/Simon & Schuster merger, the government must “prove ‘by a preponderance of the evidence’
that the effect of a challenged merger or acquisition ‘may be substantially to lessen competition.’ Mem.
Opinion, U.S. v. Bertelsmann SE & Co., 1:21CV02886 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2022) at n.15. This might be
summarized as a requirement to establish a “sufficient probability of a probability.”
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FTC, A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process, at 16-19 (1999), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/divestiture.pdf;https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/divestiture.pdf see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Merger Remedies Manual
(Sept. 2020), at 23, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1312416/download;
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1312416/download FTC, Negotiating Merger Remedies (Jan.
2012), at 10, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/negotiating-mergerremedies/merger-remediesstmt.pdf. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/negotiating-
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The FTC Study, supra note 2772, found that the effectiveness of divestitures depended on the breadth
of assets divested. Only slightly more than half of the orders were considered successes when only
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replicating pre-merger competition can be even worse if the divestee remains dependent on the
merged firm or must purchase higher cost services or inputs from third parties. Even if the
divestee can compete intensely in the short run, it may fall short in the long run by failing to
produce innovations on par with its competitors. These problems may be more severe if the
divestee￼But even if the divestiture buyer obtains an ongoing business, the divestiture may have
led to cust losses, possible supplier renegotiation, replacing services provided the seller,
resignations of some key executives or other disruptions that might prevent it from rapidly
restoring competition.105￼￼A divestee may be disadvantaged if it has less106107
A divestee also may have less incentive to compete or innovate as vigorously as the
divestiture seller —for example, if the divestee intends to sell a somewhat differentiated product
that might appeal to a somewhat different set of customers.108 Divesting to a firm that competes
with the merged firm in a different region might create the potential for coordination through
multi-market contact.109 Similarly, if the divestee is a vertically integrated firm that also supplies
certain inputs to the merged firm, it may choose to competing less intensely downstream to avoid
alienating its customer.110
Alternatively, the divestiture might replace a maverick or aggressive competitor with a
divestee that lacks similar competitive incentives. For example, the divestee’s business plan also
may involve a less vigorous competitive approach, as the agencies have recently suggested
regarding certain private equity buyers.111 The divestiture buyer may have a short-run
“selected assets” were divested, whereas all the orders involving divestitures of ongoing businesses were
considered successes. The distinction between “selected assets” and “ongoing business” is not a bright
line.
105

For an analogous classification of reasons why the divestee may not replicate the pre-merger
competitive intensity of the merging parties, see Deputy Assistant Attorney General Andrew Forman,
Antitrust Merger Enforcement: The Role of M&A Lawyers and Select Enforcement Priorities (Remarks
Prepared for Delivery) (Sept. 17, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorneygeneral-andrew-forman-delivers-keynote-abas-antitrust.
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The government alleged this concern in UHG/Change, but it was rejected by the court. UHG/Change,
Redacted Mem. Opinion, No. 1:22CV0481, at 28.
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For example, suppose the divestees in the Kroger/Albertsons merger were Trader Joes or Whole
Foods, which sell a different product mix to somewhat different groups of customers than Albertsons.
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For example, when Miller acquired Coors in the U.S., while Molson owned Coors in Canada, it might
have been suggested that Miller could punish Molson by lowering its prices in Canada if Molson reduced
prices in the U.S.
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For example, suppose the proposed divestee in the Kroger/Albertson’s merger were Proctor &
Gamble.
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See, e.g., Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan Joined by Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and
Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya, In the Matter of JAB Consumer Partners SCA SICAR, National
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perspective, focused more on “milking” the asset rather than growing it by competing more
intensely.112 Such a divestee similarly may place lower value on innovation. Furthermore, a
divestee may face fewer reputational constraints to prevent it from raising prices or reducing
quality or innovation.113
For all these reasons, we recommend that the court evaluate evidence on all these issues
rather than assume that divestee will have sufficiently equal incentives to compete as intensely as
the divestiture seller. Sufficient competitive intensity cannot be assumed or based on trust. We
recommend that the merging firms be held to a evidentiary burden because errors can lead to
significant competitive harms that are difficult if not impossible to correct later on.
In some cases, courts concluded that the divestee would fully replace or surpass the
competition provided by the divestiture seller. For example, in UHG/Change, the court rejected
the DOJ’s argument that the divestee would be disadvantaged by its failure to offer a portfolio of
products sold alongside the divested product.114 And in Arch Coal, the court found that the
divestee would be an even stronger competitor.115 In other cases, however, court concluded that
the competition provided by the divestee would fail to provide competition on par with that of
the seller. In the Libbey amended transaction, Anchor’s parent, Newell, maintained ownership of
the ongoing food service business. But Newell no longer would have owned its own production
facilities but instead was to rely on a foreign contract manufacturer, which the court found would

Veterinary Associates, Inc., and SAGE Veterinary Partners, LLC, File No. 211 0140 (June 13, 2022),
https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/public-statements/statement-chair-lina-mkhan-joined-commissioner-rebecca-kelly-slaughter-commissioneralvaro-m-bedoya; Andrew Foreman,
The Importance of Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care (Remarks Prepared for Delivery)
(June 3, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-andrewforman-delivers-keynote-abas-antitrust. It is the case that the two notable recent divestiture disasters,
the Hertz/Dollar Thrifty divestiture of Advantage and the Safeway/Albertson’s divestiture to Haggens,
both involved private equity buyers.
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Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. raised an analogous issue, where the defendant
may have had incentives to raise aftermarket prices because the number of locked-in consumers was high,
relative to the number of new purchasers. 504 U.S. 451, 476 (1992).
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See e.g., Concurring Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Federal Trade Commission v.
Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc., available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418091/081216ovationroschstmt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SLQ4-MJBJ].
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UHG/Change, supra note 1.
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Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 at 149. (“Defendants have shown that the post-merger fringe capacity
in the SPRB would be more than sufficient to absorb any increase in demand caused by any production
lag coordinated by the “big three” producers—Peabody, Kennecott, and Arch—over the next three
years... RAG and Kiewit would both be better able to play the role of maverick in the post-merger market
than would Triton if no merger occurred.”).
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lead it to face higher costs.116 In Sysco, the proposed divestee had fewer distribution centers and
its own market share projections fell short of the acquired firm’s pre-merger share, suggesting
that it would provide less of a competitive constraint than the acquired firm.117 In Aetna, the
court made a similar finding.118
The FTC study indicated that some consent decrees involving divestitures failed to
restore pre-merger levels of competition, suggesting that consumers suffer long-run harms.119
Even the divestiture consent decrees that the FTC deemed “successful” may have taken two or
three years to restore competition, a period during which there was competitive harm. Other
consent decrees classified as “qualified successes” took even longer. And an LTF divestiture
remedy that the merging party proposes, but the agency rejected based on good faith analysis,
arguably is even less likely to succeed.
That the merging firm selects the divestee reinforces these concerns. The merging firm
has incentives to divest the assets to a buyer that will be a weaker, rather than a stronger,
competitor, even if there were a buyer that would be a stronger competitor and would be willing
to pay somewhat more for the divested asset.120 The merging firm might even take actions in the
pre-divestiture period that reduces the buyer’s ability to compete intensely.121 Anticipating this,
the buyer would pay a lower price for the assets. But consumers nonetheless would be harmed.
Thus, automatically negating the structural presumption based on a proposed LTF divestiture
remedy increases the likelihood of false negatives and insufficient consent decrees.
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Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d 34 at 42-43 (“FTC questions whether the manufacturer identified by Newell,
Peldar S.A. (’Peldar’), will be a reliable resource for the glassware because it is located in Colombia, a
country that currently and has been experiencing for many years civil unrest and internal instability. The
FTC opines further that even if RCP can successfully outsource from Peldar, RCP's outsourcing costs will
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its customers, thus hindering its ability to compete with Libbey.”).
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Sysco, F. Supp. 3d 1 at 73-76.

118
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Our procedure does focus on the effect of the merger as modified by the proposed
remedy. But for all these reasons, we recommend that the court approach LTF proposals with
substantial skepticism and require a high degree of confidence before accepting the proposed
remedy as sufficient. This analysis and historical evidence suggest that an appropriate approach
is for the court essentially to presume the divestee will be a weaker competitor than the seller,
and thereby place the burden on the defendant of rebutting the presumption that the merger will
create an appreciable risk of substantially lessening competition.122
The merging parties can rebut the structural presumption by showing that the
government’s measure of concentration is incorrect because it fails to account for the impact of
the divestiture. This rebuttal would be analogous to the situation in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., where the Supreme Court held that the level and increase in concentration were
improperly measured.123 The parties would argue that the harm to competition is much less than
the hypothetical situation where the buyer acquires all the competing assets and there is no
divestiture or assets retained by the seller. The government’s response would likely be that the
competitive harm is still substantial because the divestiture buyer or the seller with retained
assets will not replicate competition as it existed before the merger. Thus, it would be incumbent
on the merging parties to show that the divestee or the residual owner would not face significant
competitive disadvantages or incentives that would result in it failing to replicate competition
pre-merger. Both sides can suggest relevant concentration estimates that account for the
efficacy or lack thereof of the proposed divestiture.124
While this discussion has been framed in terms of the structural presumption, the
overarching issue is whether or not the merger as remedied will cause a reasonable probability of
lessening competition. On the one hand, even if the divestee would not face particular
impediments, the divestiture package may be insufficient. On the other hand, even if the
divestee does not perfectly replicate the divestiture seller, the merger might not violate Section 7.
In this regard, rebuttal factors such as product substitution, competition from other rivals, ease of
entry, efficiencies and so on also will be be relevant.
Neither the timing of the divestiture proposal (or the proposal that the seller will retain
some assets), nor whether these provisions are contained in the initial HSR filing, should matter.
The economic analysis is the same either way. This is because the issue is whether the new
structure leads to a divestee (or owner of the residual assets) being a weaker competitor than the
relevant merging party would have been had it remained independent.
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Because the merging firms have the incentive to structure the divestiture to create a weaker competitor
than the selling firm, it is appropriate to presume the divestee will face impediments. This requirement
addresses the criticism that the defendant must prove a negative.
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The argument in General Dynamics was that the increase in concentration was improperly measured
using production instead of unsold reserves. See 415 U.S. 486, 510-11 (1974).
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See infra at __ for an example using HHIs.
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In cases where the structural presumption does not apply, the government might
nonetheless be able to satisfy its prima facie burden based on other evidence. If it does so,
consistent with the Baker-Hughes framework, the defendants will still bear the burden of
showing that the proposed remedy will eliminate the appreciate risk of lessening competition.
The impact of possible impediments facing the divestee might be conceptualized and
gauged in terms of a hypothetical increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index, expressing
the divestee’s competitive effectiveness as expressed in share terms.125 For example, consider a
hypothetical transaction where the buyer and seller firms have pre-merger market shares of 50%
and 20% respectively in the relevant market. At one extreme, if there were no divestiture, the
post-merger hypothetical HHI would rise by 2000 points (i.e., 2 x 50 x 20). At the other
extreme, if the seller’s business is divested and the evidence shows that the divestee would also
achieve a 20% market share, the same as the seller, then the post-merger HHI would not
increase, and the structural presumption would not be satisfied.
Consider next a middle case, where the evidence suggests that the divestee likely would
be somewhat weaker (e.g., higher cost) competitor than was the firm divesting assets and would
obtain a hypothetical market share of only 15%, with the other 5% being obtained by the
acquiring firm in the merger. In this situation, the acquirer and the divestee would contribute
3250 points (i.e., (50+5)2+152 = 3025 +225) to the post-HHI. In comparison, the merger buyer
and seller contributed 2900 points (i.e., 502 + 202 =2500+400) to the pre-merger HHI. Thus, the
increase in the hypothetical HHI from the merger and divestiture would equal 350 points (i.e.,
3250 - 2900). While this 350-point increase is much less than the 2000-point HHI increase if
there were no divestiture, it still exceeds the 200-point HHI increase identified in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines as creating a presumption of increased market power.126 Thus, if this type of
HHI analysis were used to rebut the structural presumption, that rebuttal would fail in this
case.127
Arch Coal provides an example where this approach was used to rebut an HHI based on
the merger as originally proposed. The court reported various HHI calculations based on
different measures. It then explained that “although the FTC has satisfied its prima facie case
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In Sysco, the FTC’s expert estimated post-divestiture HHI increases under various assumptions. 113 F.
Supp. 3d 1 at 53-54.
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Dept. of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) §5.23.
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As another example, suppose that evidence suggests market shares of 19% and 51% for the divestee
and buyer. In that case, these two firms would contribute 2962 points (i.e., 512+192 = 2601 + 361), an
increase of only 62 points (i.e., 2962 – 2900) over the pre-merger HHI contributions. This 62-point
increase would be too small to satisfy the structural presumption of anticompetitive effects in the Merger
Guidelines, despite the highly concentrated market.
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burden, the FTC’s prima facie case is not strong. Certainly less of a showing is required from
defendants to rebut a less-than-compelling prima facie case.”128
Instead of using an HHI proxy, court might look directly to likely cost increases or other
significant disadvantages that the divestiture buyer will face in its evaluation of the strength of
the defendant’s rebuttal case. For example, suppose the evidence indicates that the divestee’s
costs would be 5% higher than the seller’s costs absent the transaction. This significant cost
disadvantage could support the government’s prima facie case that the divestee would be a
weaker competitor and allow the defendant firm with a high market share firm to obtainor
enhance market power or possibly harm competition by facilitating improved coordination
among competiting suppliers.
These methodologies can be applied to UHG/Change. If, as the DOJ alleged, the
divested product would have lower value to customers in the divestee’s hands because the
divestee has a narrower product portfolio, competitive intensity would be reduced compared to
pre-merger levels, and consumers would be harmed. This claim might be conceptualized as the
divestee having significantly higher costs. But applying the HHI methodology here
paradoxically would lead to an HHI decrease, if the divestee would be a weaker competitor.
This decrease would represent an erroneous signal that occurs because of the parties’ relative
market shares (i.e., Change at 70% and UHG at 20%).129 For example, if the Change divestee’s
share would be 65% and UHG’ share would be 25%, the hypothetical HHI would fall, even
though the divestee’s product is assumed to have lower value, which is what leads its share to
fall.130
4. Implementation and Post-Merger Oversight
If a court finds for the defendants, thereby allowing the merger to proceed, we
recommend that the court order the remedy to be implemented.131 This is necessary, given the
firm’s commitment might be reversed or evaded.132 To ensure that behavioral restrictions or
other provisions of the remedy are not evaded, we recommend that the order also include a courtenforced monitoring and enforcement mechanism and well-specified sanctions for failure to
comply. We also recommend that enforcement of the order include provisions and a process for
modifying the remedy in the event of failure or the need for changes in order for the remedy to
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Mem. Opinion, UHG/Change, 1:22CV00481 (D.D.C. 2022) at 16.
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In UHG/Change, the court ordered the divestiture, despite finding that there was no Section 7
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This concern was raised in United States v. Dairy Farmers of America, 426 F.3d 850, 862 (6th Cir.
2005).
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succeed.133 These additions can ensure that the goal of the order —restoring competition— is
not undone.

B. Refinements and Exclusions
In setting the evidentiary standards, we recommend that courts apply a higher degree of
skepticism to various types of remedies that the merging parties may argue will prevent
anticompetitive effects from their merger. We also recommend the courts exclude consideration
of certain remedial proposals.
1. Divestitures of Selected Assets and Behavioral (Conduct) Remedies
We recommend that courts apply greater skepticism and apply a relatively high
evidentiary burden on defendants that the merger will not result in competititve harm when they
propose divestitures of only select (as opposed to all overlapping) assets. This is because such
asset divestitures tend to be less successful.134 In Libbey, for example, the court did not simply
accept the defendant’s claims but rather engaged in careful analysis and concluded that the food
service business retained by Anchor likely would have higher costs and face other post-merger
impediments.135
Greater skepticism also should apply to remedies that contain substantial behavioral
provisions. Behavioral remedies demand that the merged firm engage in conduct that it would
prefer to avoid, so it has inherent incentives to evade the requirements. In addition, the remedy
often will be difficult, if not impossible, for the agency or court to monitor the conduct to
effectively enforce.136
2. Remedies for Consummated Mergers
We also recommend greater skepticism in accepting LTF remedies in consummated
mergers where the parties have already integrated their operations, rather than holding them
separate pending outcome of the proceeding.137 In these cases, it may be more difficult to
“unscramble the eggs.” The proposed remedies thus may not involve a clean divestiture of an
ongoing but rather divestitures of selected assets. Or they might involve behavioral provisions to
support new entry, or promises of intra-corporate competition. The FTC study found that 22133

Steven C. Salop, Modifying Merger Consent Decrees: An Economist Plot to Improve Merger
Enforcement Policy, 31 ANTITRUST 15, 17 (Fall 2016).
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In evaluating a consummated merger in Otto Bock, the FTC treated the hold separate agreement as
inadequate to protect competition. While it treated the defendant’s proposed divestiture as a remedy, the
FTC rejected the remedy as inadequate. Opinion of the Commission, In re Otto Bock Healthcare North
America, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9378 at 4, 61-63 (Nov. 1, 2019) (final opinion).
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33% of the consent decrees in consummated merger cases were failures and 44-52% were only
qualified successes, while only 22-26% were considered successful.138
3. Price Maximums and Constraints
Defendants have offered to commit to price constraints in several cases. For example, in
Cardinal Health, the defendants represented that they would not raise prices.139 In H&R Block,
the defendant similarly offered to maintain the target’s price for three years.140 In Advocate141
and Penn State Hershey,142 the hospitals offered to maintain their prices for a period. While
pricing promises were not accepted in these cases, the court accepted the hospital’s price
commitment in Butterworth.143 In T-Mobile, the defendant also promised not to raise prices in
voluntary commitments to the FCC.144
We recommend that courts reject all such pricing commitments. These commitments
cannot reliably preserve competition. The commitments do not prevent anticompetitive effects
if price would have declined, but for the merger. And even if prices are effectively constrained
(which often would be unlikely), the merged firm can exercise market power by reducing the
functionality or quality of the product while charging the same prices. Moreover, the merged
firm could stop marketing the price-constrained product in favor of a new product that is not
price constrained.145 Finally, the constraint normally only lasts for a limited time (e.g., three
years in H&R Block), while the merger is permanent.
In light of all these complications, the court would need to oversee pricing and other
dimensions of competition over time and ultimately serve as an ongoing price regulator. The
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Supreme Court in Trenton Potteries clearly warned district courts to avoid such remedies that
require such oversight.146
4. Vertical Merger Promises of Divisional Separation
Courts also should be skeptical when parties to vertical mergers promise that their
separate vertically-related divisions will act as if they are independent companies and will not
favor one another or engage in price or non-price foreclosure of rivals, even if the firm has the
ability and incentive to foreclose. The agencies rejected such promises, leading to merger
abandonments, in LAM/KLA,147 Nvidia/ARM,148 and Lockheed Martin/Aerojet Rocketdyne.149
But the courts accepted promises in AT&T/Time Warner150 and UHG/Change.151 Those courts
were persuaded by corporate executives’ testimony that they would fulfill their promises to
maintain the trust of customers that now would also be competitors. The executives claimed that
violating the trust would harm the merged company’s reputation and long-term profits. In both
cases, there was testimony that the firms had not engaged in foreclosure tactics in the past,
though their previous vertical integration was substantially less significant than it would be after
the instant transaction. The companies also entered contractual obligations.152
These promises assume that the merged firm will in conflict with its economic incentives
to foreclose rivals and history is not a reliable guide to future conduct when circumstances
change significantly. When a corporation expands vertically and has market power sufficient to
foreclose downstream competition, its decision calculus regarding neutrality towards customers
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that are rivals is altered 153 Importantly, the firm’s withholding of access to critical inputs may
not even be necessary to harm competition. The customers that are also competitors will
understand that the merged firm has gained increased bargaining leverage and so will agree to
pay higher prices for inputs.154 The merged firm will not suffer reputational harm if breaches of
the promises cannot be detected. And most importantly, the foreclosed customers must have
good alternatives to obtain inputs for the loss of trust to matter.155
These impediments to detection of broken commitments are key issues for the court to
investigate, even if the promises are made contractual. If the upstream division drives a harder
bargain with competitors of the downstream division, a court, arbitrator, or compliance monitor
seeking to determine whether the merged firm has breached a commitment often will be unable
to distinguish between a foreclosure strategy versus normal bargaining that does not
impermissibly disfavor the firm’s downstream rivals.156 This problem is more severe if most or
all customers of the upstream division are competitors of the downstream division because there
will be no good benchmark of behavior towards a non-competitor for comparison of pricing or
other competitive behavior. Requiring non-discriminatory prices also can give the merged firm
the incentive to raise the prices to all its customers.157
Simple refusals to supply might be detectable, but little else. When products are unique,
there also will be no benchmark for comparing the prices charged or the quality of products or
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services provided to rivals of the merged firm’s downstream division. This detection problem is
even worse for innovation activities. A court, arbitrator, or compliance monitor would find it
nearly impossible to detect if the upstream division is (for example) assigning the A-Team to
working with its own downstream division to innovate but assigning the B-Team to the rival.158
For all these reasons, we are very skeptical that effective detection would be possible.
Given, these severe detection problems, if the court chooses to accept behavioral
commitments to address vertical anticompetitive concerns, we recommend that it follow a “trust
but verify” approach. Effective enforcement requires (i) making the promised remedy legally
binding, (ii) mandating a reporting and monitoring mechanism to verify that the promised
conduct is adhered to, and (iii) mandating well-specified (and large) sanctions for failure to
comply, including judicial discretion to modify the commitments if the remedy fails or
modifications are necessary to ensure success, which the court would oversee. Unless the court
has confidence that violations would be deterred by its detection and punishment procedure, it
should not bless the fix.
5. Horizontal Merger Promises of Intra-Corporate Competition
A defendant sometimes may proffer as a remedy the promise that it will instruct its
separate divisions to compete as if they were separate firms. The FTC ordered such a remedy in
the “highly unusual” Evanston/Northwestern merger, which had been consummated years
earlier.159 After that, courts rejected similar intra-corporate competition remedies in both the In
re Promedica Health System, Inc.160 and St. Alphonsus Med. Center Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health
System161 hospital transactions. A court, however, recently accepted a unilateral promise of
continued intra-corporate competition in United States v. Booz Allen Hamilton Co.162 (“Booz
Allen/EverWatch”).
The court in United States v. Bertelsmann SE & Co. (Penguin
RandomHouse/Simon&Schuster) rejected a proposed intra-corporate competition promise.163
The court denied the DOJ’s motion in limine, opining that the case law does not support a
blanket exclusion of such unilateral promises and that “unenforceability of the [proposed intra158
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corporate] bidding policy goes to weight and not admissibility.”164 In a strongly worded opinion,
however, the court concluded that it “gives no weight to this unenforceable promise,”165 finding
that the promise would not be profit-maximizing (so the merged firm would have incentives to
break it), could be broken at will, and would not prevent the merged firm from keeping
itsdivisions from competing robustly with one another.166 As author Stephen King characterized
the promise in his trial testimony, “You might as well say you're going to have a husband and
wife bidding against each other for the same house. It's kind of ridiculous.”167
We recommend that courts treat such promises as inadmissible. They require the
combined firm’s corporate divisions to act in direct conflict with the unified firm’s fundamental
economic incentives and are inherently unenforceable. As a legal matter, the remedy also is in
direct conflict with the rule of Copperweld168 that intra-corporate conspiracies are not actionable
because sister components of the same corporations are not independent actors. Overseeing such
remedial promises would turn district courts into regulatory commissars to ensure that the
separate divisions are truly competing against each other, the sort of role that antitrust courts
have rejected since Trenton Potteries.169
Moreover, this remedy has no limits. Under the logic of the remedy, all the firms in a
market could merge to monopoly, so long as the surviving corporation promises that the
divisions will continue to compete against each other, perhaps also offering management
compensation based on divisional rather than corporate profits. Indeed, if Copperweld and
Trenton Potteries are superseded, then the blanket immunization from attacks on intra-corporate
joint pricingsetting also should be rejected. .
Furthermore, breaches of promises to engage in intra-corporate competition would be
practically unenforceable since they are highly unlikely to be detectable. Comparing the bidding
behavior of the separate divisions would fail to uncover breaches because every division has the
incentive to lighten up against each other. Rewards or other incentives that chill intra-division
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competition would be very difficult (if not impossible) to detect.170 Moreover, stock options
would have to be prohibited since are based on corporate profits, not just divisional profits. In
short, unless some executive simply admits to violating the rule in emails, there would be no
direct evidence. Again, Trenton Potteries counsels courts against such an oversight role and
instead reject such remedies.
Merging firms might propose a backup arbitration process. However, light of the
complexity of market forces, customers and arbitrators would face the same inability to
determine whether the firms’ conduct is the result of a breach of the promise rather than
independent actions in. Simply stated, a “trust but verify” procedure would be highly unlikely to
deter violations of these promises.
The recent decision by the district court in Booz Allen/EverWatch was problematical for
an additional reason. The customer—i.e., the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA)—had
chosen to rely on competitive bidding for a new contract to obtain the best offer, and only Booz
Allen and EverWatch responded with “Letters of Intent to Bid.”171 The DOJ argued that the
pending merger agreement between the two firms would eliminate the incentives of each to
compete for the contract because competition would reduce the profits of the to-be-merged
company.172 The DOJ thus alleged that the merger agreement itself would violate Section 1.173
The court rejected this claim, concluding that the two companies’ fear of losing future business
from a tarnished reputation and the personal pride and reputations of the managers would be
sufficient ensure post-merger intra-corporate competition.174 Ignoring the fact that NSA had
opted for competitive bidding, the court concluded that NSA would be protected by these
reputational factors, despite the inherent change in the bidders’ economic incentives.175
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Accepting this remedy directly conflicts with the policy articulated in National Society of
Professional Engineers.176 The Court made it plain that while a customer certainly can choose to
negotiate a sole source contract rather than rely on competitive bidding, it is not permissible for
the sellers themselves to make the decision to supersede the customer’s decision to use
competitive bidding. Nor should a court rely on promises that the firms will continue to compete
independently, despite the change in their incentives.
6. Defendant’s Choice of Divestee
The defendant has an incentive to choose a less competitive divesture buyer. The merged
firm’s post-merger profits will be reduced if a lower-cost or otherwise more competitive divestee
charges lower prices or offers better quality or innovation that the merged firm must match. This
raises the question of whether the defendant should have carte blanche to choose any divestee
that arguably would preserve competition. As an alternative, the court might require a procedure
analogous to the one used for failing firms, whereby the preferred divestee would be the one that
leads to the most competition.177 While beyond the scope of this article, this is an issue that
deserves more study.

C. Implementation of the Procedure
New legislation is not necessary. Courts can incorporate our recommended procedure
into their case management. For example, the court can require the defendant to make the
remedy filing, provide the agency a timeframe to issue one or more subpoenas, and provide for
time after compliance with the discovery requests before commencing briefing and trial. The
court also can decide how to apply the structural presumption and allocate evidentiary burdens.
A body of law can then develop from courts’ treatment of these issues.
In anticipation of the court’s adoption of this procedure, the agency and the merging
parties have incentives to negotiate agreements during the pre-complaint period that set
disclosure, timing, and discovery provisions if there is an LTF proposal, just as they commonly
negotiate timing agreements today.

VI. Conclusions
We hope that our proposed procedure can lead to uniformity in howLTF is adjudicated.
Our proposal highlights the three key, related dimensions of the procedure and explains why
placing the burden on the defendant to justify remedial provisions with evidence is supported by
the statute, the case law, merger enforcement experience, and economic analysis. Our analysis
also explains why it would not make economic sense simply to assume that a divestee will be a
perfect competitive replacement for the seller, rather than require the defendant to provide that
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evidence. Our analysis also explains why courts should treat certain types of proposed remedies
with skepticism or not consider them at all.
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